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INTRODUCTION

Abortion has always been a topic of controversy and deep societal and
political divisions. "Pro-choice" and "pro-life" groups occupy opposite
sides of the vigorous debate over the morality and lawfulness of abortion.
These opposing views are influenced by, inter alia, one's philosophy, life
experiences, religious background, and moral standards.' While proabortion or anti-abortion legislation may hurt the morals of either side of
the controversy, these morals should not influence the constitutional
analysis of a case. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said, "[the
Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel,
and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States." 2
The Supreme Court's 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade3 carved out a
fundamental right from the right to privacy and framed it as "the right of
a woman to terminate a pregnancy." 4 It was not until 1980 that the two
major political parties had adopted extreme positions, with Republicans
falling in the "pro-life" category and Democrats falling in the "prochoice" category. 5
Abortion jurisprudence remained virtually unchanged until 1992. In
1992, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey6 rejected the trimester framework of Roe and
replaced it with an extremely ambiguous7 and "inherently manipulable" 8
undue burden standard. These ambiguities left open two possible types of
review under the undue burden test: (1) deferential undue burden; and (2)
a tougher test that I refer to as undue burden with a bite. 9 This has resulted
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1906) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Id. at 153.
5. James Taranto, The "Roe Effect," 42 Soc. 13, 13 (2005), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
BF02687476.
6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7. Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 878 (1994).
8. Casey, 505 U.S. at 985-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. See discussion infra Part II.B. I would like to give Professor Darren Hutchinson credit
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in judges having the discretion to decide abortion cases in a manner that
reflects their own political or ideological views.' 0 Considering the 2016
presidential," congressional,1 2 and state' 3 elections, these findings are
troubling for "pro-choice" groups and uplifting for "pro-life" groups. The
elections, along with the fact that there are 21 vacancies on the U.S. Court
of Appeals, and 121 on the U.S. District Courts, should give hope to "prolife" groups and nightmares to "pro-choice" groups.14
While strict scrutiny as the standard of review for the right to abortion
would be preferable because the Court has applied the standard in
numerous cases when evaluating governmental invasion of fundamental
rights protected by the due process clause, the election results foreclose
this argument. Hence, this Article proposes an undue burden standard that
comes close to strict or intermediate scrutiny. The standard eliminates a
State's interest in promoting life or potential life of a fetus before viability
and reduces the discretion accorded to lower courts by making the test
less amorphous and flexible.
Part L.A describes Roe, its progeny, and the political fall-out that
followed Roe. Part 1.13 describes the 1992 landmark decision, Casey, and
how the Court shifted from a rigid trimester and strict scrutiny approach
to the undue burden standard. Part II deconstructs the undue burden
standard used in Casey and demonstrates the range of applications of
undue burden in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Using
statistical analysis, Part III demonstrates that the flexible nature of the
undue burden standard has resulted in judges deciding the
constitutionality of abortion regulations based largely on their political or
ideological views. Finally, Part IV argues that the Court should eliminate
a State's interest, pre-viability, in promoting the life or potential life of
the fetus, and should adopt the undue burden with a bite standard.

for coining the term "undue burden with a bite."

10.

See discussion infra Part 111.

11. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump is Elected President in
Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/1 l/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html?_rO.
12. Karoun Demirjian, Republicans Keep Control of Congress After Decisive Senate Wins
in Missouri, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Wisconsin and N.C., WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/08/senate-house-majorities-han
g-in-the-balance-on-election-day/?utmterm=.3e216d3a5269.
13. Amber Phillips, These 3 Maps Show Just How Dominant Republicans are in America
After Tuesday, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/11/12/these-3-maps-show-just-how-dominant-republicans-are-in-america-after-tues

day/?utm term=.4b 1984122e22.
14.

U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/j udici

al-vacancies (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ABORTION RIGHTS

At the core of the right to seek an abortion lies the right to personal
privacy.1 5 The Court first recognized a constitutional right to abortion in
Roel 6 by expanding earlier decisions that tied reproductive freedom with
the right to privacy.' 7 In Griswold v. Connecticut,18 the Court, relying on
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ulman,19 derived the right to privacy
from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.2 0 The Court held that married
persons had the right to use contraception based upon their right to
privacy within the home and their general right to marital privacy.21 A
few years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 2 the Court extended the right to
use contraception to unmarried persons. 23 Hence, the right to privacy
became a fundamental right.
A. Roe v. Wade, its Progeny, and the PoliticalBacklash
1. Roe v. Wade
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that the Texas
abortion statute prohibiting abortion was unconstitutional. 24 In Roe, the
plaintiff Jane Roe was an unmarried pregnant woman who wished to
terminate her pregnancy. 25 Texas law, however, limited abortion to
situations in which the pregnancy endangered the life of the mother. 2 6
15. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choice a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy ... is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
16. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (holding that the right of personal privacy includes
abortion decision).
17. See id. at 151-52.
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
20. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The Court relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, which stated that "[Liberty] is a rational continuum which. . . includes a freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposely restraints, . . . and which also recognizes ...
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs assisted to justify their
abridgment." Id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 543).
21. Id. at 485-86.
22. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
23. Id. at 453 ("if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."). The Court
did not apply strict scrutiny here. Id. at 448.
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
25. Id. at I19.
26. Article 1196 of the abortion statute provided for abortion procured for the purpose of
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This exception did not apply to Jane Roe. Jane Roe could not afford to
travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion under safe
conditions. 2 7 The Court held that the right of privacy encompassed a right
of a woman to terminate a pregnancy and this right was fundamental in
nature. 2 8 However, the Court noted that this fundamental right was not
absolute 29 and that at some point a State's interest in safeguarding health,
maintaining medical standards, and protecting life become dominant.3 0
To balance a woman's fundamental right to abortion with a State's
interest, the Court developed a trimester approach based on when a
State's interest becomes compelling.31
The Court determined that a State's important and legitimate interest
in the health of the mother becomes compelling at the end of the first
trimester. 3 2 At this point in the pregnancy, "a State may regulate the
abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonablyrelates to
the preservation and protection of maternal health." 3 3 A State's legitimate
interest in potential life becomes compelling at the point of viability-the
point when the fetus can survive outside the womb. 4 At this stage, a State
could proscribe abortion, "except when it is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother." 3 5
Thus, under the Roe framework, a woman's right to abortion is almost
absolute during the first trimester. During the second trimester, a State's
regulation of abortion will be met with the most exacting scrutiny:
regulations limiting abortion will only be valid if they pursue a
compelling state interest (maternal health) and are narrowly tailored to
that interest. 36 During the third trimester, a State's interest in protecting
prenatal life becomes compelling, and the State can proscribe abortion as,
long as there is a life or health exception. 3 7

saving the life of the mother. Id. at 118 n.1 (listing various articles in the Texas statute).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 119.
Id at 153.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). While the Court only emphasized the "safeguarding health"

interest in this trimester, it is evident from the examples of permissible state regulation provided
by the Court that it intended to include another recognized legitimate state interest: maintaining

medical standards. Id. ("Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as
.

to the qualification of person who is to perform the abortion . .
34. Id

35. Id. at 163-64.
36. Id at 155.
37. Id at 163-64.
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2. Post Roe Decisions: Eroding the Line Between First and Second
Trimester; Recognizing New State Interests; and Striking Down
Abortion Regulation
In the 19 years between Roe and Casey, the Supreme Court applied
the trimester test in numerous cases. In these cases, the Court recognized
new state interests and slowly eroded the "absolute" abortion right during
the first trimester. The first major abortion case after Roe was Planned
Parenthoodof CentralMissouriv. Danforth.3 8 The majority struck down
provisions in a state law that mandated spousal consent, 3 9 required
parental consent for a minor, 4 0 prohibited the use of saline
amniocentesis, 4 1 and required physicians to preserve the life and health
of the fetus at every stage of pregnancy.4 2 However, the Court upheld the
statute's definition of viability 4 3 and a first-trimester informed consent
requirement." In upholding this informed consent provision, the Court
recognized a new state interest: ensuring that a woman is fully informed
and aware of the significance of her decision. 4 5 One year later in two
decisions, Maher v. Roe 4 6 and Beal v. Doe,4 7 the Court upheld a ban on
funding for non-medically necessary abortions. 4 8 In 1980, the Court took
the decision in Maher and Beal a step further when it upheld a ban on
funding for medically necessary abortions. 4 9 In 1979, in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti I),50 the Court stated that parental notification or consent
requirement before minors could procure abortions is permissible only if

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 55 (1976).
Id at 69.
Id. at 74.
Id at 79.
Id. at 83-84.
.

43. Id. at 65. The Court, citing Roe v. Wade, stated "[i]n Roe, we used the term 'viable,' .
to signify the point at which the fetus is 'potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,

albeit with artificial aid,' and presumably capable of 'meaningful life outside the mother's
womb."' Id. at 63.
44. Id. at 67. The Court acknowledged the "absolute" right of women to seek abortion
during the first trimester. Id. at 66. But, it still held the requirement to be constitutional. Id.

45. Id. at 69 (recognizing the importance of being fully informed because of the stressful
nature of the abortion decision). This could arguably be the first inception of undue burden. The
regulation was not putting an unnecessary hurdle for women seeking abortion, it was merely

making sure that women were fully informed. Thus, eroding the bright-line drawn by the majority
in Roe.

46.
47.
48.
abortions

432 U.S. 464 (1977).
432 U.S. 438 (1977).
Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 (upholding a ban on funding for non-medically necessary
combined with funding for childbirth); Beal, 432 U.S. at 447 (upholding a ban on

funding for non-medically necessary abortion).

49.
50.

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980).
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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the law contains a "judicial bypass"'I procedure. 52 Thus, the Court further
diminished the trimester bright-line drawn by Roe by recognizing a new
state interest that was applicable throughout the pregnancy: protecting
minors from making decisions that they are not capable of
comprehending. 53
Expanding on the right recognized in Bellotti II, Justice Burger in HL.
v. Matheson54 upheld a provision that required physicians to notify, if
possible, the parents or guardian of the minor upon whom an abortion is
to be performed. 5 In upholding this statute, the Court recognized another
important state interest: fostering parental authority and family
56
fute
integrity, ergo, further diminishing the bright line between the first
trimester and second trimester (when the state's interest becomes
compelling).5 7 In 1983, the Court invalidated regulations requiring: (1)
abortions to be performed in a hospital subsequent to the end of the first
trimester of a woman's pregnancy,5 8 (2) blanket parental consent for a
minor,5 9 (3) informed consent,6 0 (4) physicians to wait 24 hours before
performing an abortion after the pregnant woman signs consent form, 6 1
and (5) physicians who perform abortions to ensure that the remains of
the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner. 62
Although these cases might appear in line with Roe because they did
not explicitly overrule the trimester approach, they were, in reality,
slowly moving away from the trimester approach of Roe. Beginning in
51. Judicial bypass is a procedure whereby a minor can obtain authorization for abortion
through the judicial process rather than obtaining the authorization from her parents. See, e.g.,

Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983) (upholding a
parental consent procedure that provided for judicial bypass as outlined in Bellotti l).

52.

Bellottill, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979).

53.

Id. at 635 ("[Djuring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often

lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them."). Curiously, the Court, while ruling the statute unconstitutional, uses the
term undue burden in a similar fashion the Court in Casey uses it. Id. at 647 ("[Cjonstrued in this
manner, § 12S would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an

abortion.") (emphasis added).
54. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
55. Id. at 411-13.
56. Id. at 411 ("As applied to immature and dependent minors, the statute plainly serves
the important considerations of family integrity and protecting adolescents.").
57. Id. at 413 ("As applied to the class before us, the statute plainly serves important state
interests, is narrowly drawn to protect those interests.").

58.

City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 437 (1983)

(holding that the regulation did not meet the strict scrutiny requirement); Planned Parenthood of

Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983).
59. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 442.
60. Id. at 445 (holding that State's interest in ensuring informed consent was beyond
permissible limits).
61. Id at 45051.
62. Id. at 451-52.
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1976, with Justice Stevens replacing Justice Douglas, the Court started
diminishing the line between the absolute right to abortion during the first
trimester and the second trimester as recognized in Roe. 6 3 The Court's
decision in Bellotti II and H. L. v. Matheson further diminished the bright
line by recognizing a State's interest in protecting minors from making
decisions that they are not capable of comprehending throughout the
pregnancy.64 However, two cases portended the Court's ultimate
departure from Roe's trimester framework. When the Court decided these
cases, Justice O'Connor had replaced Justice Stewart and had become the
dissenting voice of the Court, along with Justice White and Justice
Rehnquist. 65 Starting in Akron I, the dissenting Justices argued against
the rigid trimester framework, and Justice O'Connor argued for an
"undue burden" standard.6 6
By 1989, only three of the Justices from the majority in Roe remained
on the Court. Justice Burger had retired, and the vacancy was filed by
Justice Scalia; Justice Kennedy replaced Justice Powell; Justice Stevens
replaced Justice Douglas; and Justice O'Connor replaced Justice
Stewart.6 7 The new Justices were nominated by conservative Presidents,
and due to these changes the Court's approach to abortion shifted
noticeably in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.6 8 A plurality of
the Court upheld the challenged legislation using rational basis review. 6 9
The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist openly criticized the
trimester approach and urged that abortion regulation be subject to
rationality review. 70 The fundamental right to abortion survived this shift
in power of the Court. Five Justices refused to use Webster as an occasion
63.

The Court allowed state interference during the first trimester, and recognized a State's

interest in ensuring that the pregnant woman is informed and aware of the significance of her
decision. Planned Parenthood of Cent Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, 69 (1976) (recognizing
the stressful nature of the abortion decision and the importance of being fully informed).
64. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[D]uring the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.

398, 411 (1981) ("As applied to immature and dependent minors, the statute plainly serves the
important considerations of family integrity and protecting adolescents . . . .").
65. Justice White and Rehnquist were the only two dissenting opinions in Roe v. Wade.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Thornburg v. Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that abortion regulation need only survive rational basis scrutiny unless the regulation imposes an
undue burden on a woman's right to choose).
67. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SuPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2016)
[hereinafter Members of the Supreme Court].

68.
69.
70.

492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521 (noting that it sought to "modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases").
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for reconsidering Roe. Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall argued
for upholding Roe;71 Justice Stevens declined to modify Roe;7 2 and
Justice O'Connor refused to reconsider the validity of Roe. 73 In two
subsequent cases, the Court declined to overturn the trimester framework
of Roe. 7 4
However, before Casey, the Court had shifted even further to the right
with the retirement of Justices Marshall and Brennan. These Justices were
replaced by Justices Thomas and Souter, respectively, both of whom were
appointed by President George H.W. Bush.7 5 The Court's ideological
shift, along with the politics 7 6 following Roe, threatened the future of
abortion as a fundamental right.
3. Politics After Roe
The Court's decision in Roe sparked a 'Right to Life' movement that
realigned the party loyalty of millions of Americans; with Democrats
becoming the chief champions for abortion and Republicans as its most
ardent critics. 77 Many believe that Roe was responsible for singlehandedly causing polarization and party realignment around the question
of abortion.7 8 By 1980, both major political parties had adopted extreme
positions, with Republicans favoring "pro-life" constitutional
amendment to ban abortion and Democrats opposing virtually all
regulation on "pro-choice" grounds. 7 9
The polarizing effect of Roe can be noticed in the judicial
confirmation process. The analysis is limited to the Supreme Court
confirmations by the Senate between 1973, when Roe was decided and
1992, when Casey was decided. Within this period, Presidents Ford,
Reagan, and Bush nominated eight judges.8 0
Judge John Paul Stevens was nominated in 1975 by President Ford,
71.

Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

72.
73.

Id. at 561 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

74. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990).
75.
76.
77.

Members of the Supreme Court, supra note 67.
See discussion infra Part I.A.3.
Ken I. Kerch, Justice Breyer's Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 759, 797, 814

(2006).
78.

See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (And After) Roe v. Wade: New

Questions About Backlash, 129 YALE L.J. 2028, 2073 (2011); but cf id. (arguing that the Court is
not solely responsible for the polarization on abortion).
79. Taranto, supra note 5, at 13.
80. Judges John Paul Steven, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork,
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas. Justice Rehnquist was appointed as Chief
Justice during this era. Supreme Court Nominations, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/

pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2016).
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who was from the "pro-life" political party.8 1 He was unanimously
confirmed by the Democratic controlled Senate.8 2 No Senator asked
Justice Stevens a single question about abortion. 83 In the context of 1975,
the omission was not surprising because Roe had been decided by a 7-2
margin, and hence the decision appeared to be on solid grounds. 8 4
Abortion had not yet become a flashpoint in national politics. It was
not until President Reagan's election in 1980 when conservative
Republicans made common cause with evangelical Christians that antiabortion causes came to the forefront of judicial nominations.85 During
his presidential bid, Reagan pledged the "support of a constitutional
amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children,"
and called for the overturning of Roe. 8 6 All four of President Reagan's
nominees (then Judges O'Connor, Scalia, Bork, and Kennedy) were
asked questions about their stance on Roe, and whether they would
overturn it. 8 7 Judge Bork was the only nominee that was rejected by the
Democratic controlled Senate.8 8 When Judge Bork was nominated,
Senator Kennedy, in his opposition to the nomination, called Bork's
America a place where "women would be forced into back alley
abortions." 89 Arguably, it was, at least in part, Judge Bork's anti-abortion
stance that lost him the seat. 90 Similarly, President George H.W. Bush's
nominees (then Judges Thomas and Souter) were asked about their stance
8 1.
82.

Id.
Id.

83. Nomination ofJohn Paul Stevens, ofIll., to be an Assoc. Justice ofthe Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975).
84. Linda Greenhouse, Justice John Paul Stevens as Abortion-Rights Strategist, 43 U.C.

DAVIS L. REv. 749, 751 (2010).
85. Id.
86.

Neal Devins, How PlannedParenthoodv. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion

Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1326(2009).
87. Supreme Court Nominations, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Oct 8, 2016); The Nomination
ofJudge Sandra Day O'ConnorofAriz. to Serve as an Assoc. Justice ofthe Supreme Court ofthe
UnitedStates: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong. (1981); The Nomination
ofJudge Antonin Scalia ofArizona to be Assoc. Justice ofthe Supreme Courtofthe UnitedStates:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong. (1986); The Nomination ofRobert H
Bork to be Assoc. Justice ofthe Supreme Court ofthe UnitedStates: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1987); The Nomination ofRobert H Bork to be Assoc. Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. (1987); The Nomination ofAnthony M. Kennedy to be Assoc. Justice ofthe Supreme Court
ofthe UnitedStates: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 00th Cong. (1987).
88. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 87; Majority and Minority Leaders, U.S.
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefingMajorityMinorityLea

ders.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2016).
89.

Joe Nocera,

The

Ugliness Started with Bork, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.

21, 2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/opinion/nocera-the-ugliness-all-started-with-bork.html.
90. See id.
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on abortion, and both refused to directly answer questions related to
Roe. 91

By 1992, the six Justices from the majority of Roe had retired and
were replaced by Justices nominated by Republican presidents. This,
along with the diminishing line between the trimesters resulted in the
unrest and fear that Roe v. Wade would be overruled or that the right to
abortion would no longer be a fundamental right.
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey-The Undue Burden Standard
When Casey reached the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
along with Justices Kennedy, Scalia, White and Thomas, were ready to
overturn Roe. 92 The justices had decided the Casey decision, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist was working on writing the opinion. 9 3 Justice Kennedy,
however, switched sides and joined the liberal and moderate justices who
voted to uphold Roe. 94 After Justice Blackmun, the last remaining Justice.
from Roe majority, died, researchers discovered a letter from Justice
Kennedy to Justice Blackmun. The letter stated "Dear Harry, I need to
91. Supreme CourtNominations, supra note 87; The Nomination ofDavid H Souter to be
Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990); The Nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas to be Assoc. Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d

Cong. (1991).
92. Steven Ertelt, Justice Blackmuns's Documents Show Roe v. Wade Almost Fell in 1992,
LIFENEWS.COM (Mar. 4, 2004, 9:00 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2004/03/04/nat-363/.

93.

Id.

94.

Part I of the joint opinion by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter was joined by

Justices Blackmun and Stevens. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 84346 (1992) (upholding the essential holding of Roe v. Wade). Part II of the joint opinion was once
again joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. See id. at 846-53 (concluding that women's right
to choose derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Part Ill of the
joint opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. See id. at 854-69 (concluding that
overruling Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would be erroneous, and

would affect the Court's legitimacy). No other Justices joined Part IV of the joint opinion. See id.
at 869-79 (rejecting the trimester framework of Roe and adopting undue burden as a test for
finding whether a particular regulation impedes upon the abortion right of women). Part V.A of
the joint opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. See id. at 879-80 (holding that
the medical emergency definition imposed no undue burden). None of the other justices joined
Part V.B of the opinion. Id. at 881-87 (holding that the informed consent requirement, i.e., the
24-hour waiting period is not an undue burden on the abortion right, and hence is constitutional).
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined the opinion in Part V.C. See id at 887-98 (holding spousal
notification requirement as an undue burden, and hence unconstitutional). None of the other

Justices joined the opinion in Part V.D. Id. at 899-900 (holding that a regulation requiring parental
or guardian consent is constitutional, as long as there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure).
Part V.E of the joint opinion was joined by Justice Stevens. See id. at 900-01 (holding that the

record keeping and reporting provision, with the exception of the spousal reporting notice, was
constitutional). Part VI of the joint opinion was joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun. See id.
at 901.
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see you as soon as you have a few free moments. I want to tell you about
some developments in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and at least part of
what I say should come as welcome news."9 5 The letter signaled that
Justice Kennedy would support reaffirmance of Roe. Ultimately, in
Casey, the Court upheld the essential principles of Roe. 9 6
At issue in Casey were the five Pennsylvania regulations impeding on
the right to abortion: (1) 24-hour waiting period, 97 (2) parental consent
for a minor with a judicial bypass o tion, 9 8 (3) spousal notification, 9 9 4)
definition of medical emergency,
and (5) reporting requirements. 01
Along with these regulations, the validity of the Court's holding in Roe
was also at issue. 102
The majority reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe.1 0 3 In doing so,
it recognized the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability, a State's power to restrict abortions after viability as long as
there is a life or health exception, and a State's legitimate interest in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may
become a child.1 0 4 However, the plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter rejected Roe's trimester framework.1 0 5 Instead, it
recognized viability as the crucial line for abortionl 0 6 and adopted the
undue burden standard to reconcile the State's interest with a woman's
right to abortion.1 0 7 Under this test, a regulation would constitute if it has
"the purpose or effect of placing substantial obstacle in the path of a

95.
2004),
html.

Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution ofa Justice, N.Y. TIMs (Mar. 4,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/us/documents-reveal-the-evolution-of-a-justice.

96.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained

and once again reaffirmed.").

97.

Id. at 844 ("The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed

consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information

at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed.").
98. Id. ("For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of
her parents, but provides for ajudicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain
a parent's consent.").
99. Id. ("[U]nless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must
sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion.").

100. Id. ("The Act exempts compliance with these three requirements in the event of a
'medical emergency,'. . .").
101. Id. ("[T]he Act imposes certain reporting requirements on facilities that provide
abortion services.").
102. Id.
103. Id. at 846.
104. Id.
105.

Id. at 873 ("We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of

the essential holding of Roe.").
106. Id. at 870.
107. Id. at 876.
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woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' 0 8 Applying this test to
the five regulations at issue, the Court found all but the spousal
notification requirement constitutional. 109
One of the glaring differences between Casey and Roe is that the
plurality shifted away from the strict scrutiny standard of review to a
more permissive undue burden standard.' 10 Unlike the strict scrutiny
standard that placed the burden of proof on the states to prove that the
challenged provision was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
purpose,"' the undue burden standard shifted burden on the person
challenging the regulation to prove improper purpose or to show that the
law had an effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.11 2 This shift was surprising considering that the
majority in Casey purported to uphold the essential holding of Roe. Roe,
however, described abortion as a fundamental right and applied strict
scrutiny-the traditional standard used in right of privacy cases. 113
II. UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD: DEFERENTIAL UNDUE BURDEN
VERSUS UNDUE BURDEN WITH A BITE

The undue burden standard established by the plurality in Casey is a
two-prong test, where each prong is self-sufficient and can operate
independently from one another. The inquiry is whether the "state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."ll 4 This
statement by the plurality creates a purpose prong and an effect prong.
Under the purpose prong, a statute is invalid when the "means chosen by
the State to further potential life" is calculated to hinder a woman's free
choice."' The effect prong is essentially divided into two parts. A statute
is invalid if, while furthering a State's valid interest, it has the effect of
108.

Id. at 877.

109. Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned
ParenthoodofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 11, 18 (1992).
110. Kathryn Kolber & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1155

(1993).
111.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 567 (5th Ed.

2015).
112. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake.").

114.
115.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
Id.
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placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice.116 if,
however, the statute does not have that effect, the inquiry turns to whether
the regulation is reasonably related to the legitimate state interest." 7
Although the majority of the Court disagreed with the undue burden
standard, the Court eventually adopted it in Stenberg v. Carhart(Carhart
118

The undue burden standard, while simple on its face, is extremely
difficult to apply. The inherent difficulties in applying the undue burden
test are discussed below. 1 9
A. Decoding Undue Burden: A Game ofPuzzles
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." 2 0 With this
statement, the plurality set out to explain the undue burden standard
which would come to govern abortion regulations. Ironically, it replaced
a very rigid trimester approach established by the Court in Roe, where the
applicable standard-strict scrutiny-was clear. Federal courts used this
test in numerous precedent evaluating governmental invasion of
fundamental rights protected by the due process clause 2 1 and in the
context-of discrimination against suspect classes in the equal protection
context. 12 2 Undue burden, by contrast, is extremely ambiguous1 2 3 and
"inherently manipulable" 24 because the Court's application of the
standard in Casey was riddled with inconsistencies.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky outlines the possible ambiguities
present in the undue burden standard. First, ambiguity arises due to the
difficulty in applying the undue burden standard because it melds
together three distinct issues: 12 5 is the right infringed; is the infringement
justified by a sufficient purpose; and are the means sufficiently related to
the end sought? 2 6 Second, ambiguity arises because the undue burden
test has an internal tension. While the joint opinion states that the State

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 878.
Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
See discussion infra Part II.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
121. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 111, at 567.
122. The Court applies strict scrutiny for discrimination based on race, alienage, or national
origin. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
123.

Brownstein, supra note 7, at 878 ("The description of the 'undue burden' test ...

[is]

not free from ambiguity.").
124. Casey, 505 U.S. at 985-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Joint opinions] efforts at
clarification make clear only that the standard is inherently manipulability and will prove
hopelessly unworkable in practice.").
...

125.

CHEMERINSKY, supranote 111, at 863.

126.

Id.
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cannot act with the purpose of creating obstacles to abortion, the opinion
holds that states can act with the purpose of discouraging abortion and
encouraging birth, which inherently requires a law limiting abortion.1 2 7
Third, ambiguity arises because the Court is unclear as to how many
women must be adversely affected by a regulation of abortion for the
regulation to be considered an undue burden.1 2 8
As shown below, the primary deficiency in the plurality's opinion,
and the reason for ambiguity, is the lack of guidance in how to determine
the relative strength of review accorded to regulations after Casey. While
the plurality tried to give guiding principles, 129 and hence clarify the
standard of review, it created a standard that is "hopelessly
unworkable." 30 The standard is "hopelessly unworkable" because the
combination of the rationality review and the substantial obstacle
requirement makes it difficult to determine the strength of review
applicable to abortion regulation. 13 1
The confusion is not resolved by examining the Court's application of
the undue burden standard to Pennsylvania's abortion regulations.1 32 As
Justice Scalia contends, "[T]he joint opinion ... highlight[s] certain facts
in the record ... [and] after describing these facts, the opinion then simply
announces that the provision either does or does not impose a 'substantial
obstacle' . . . ."133 This is apparent in the Court's application of the undue

burden standard for the 24-hour waiting period requirement and the
spousal notification requirement. Although the Court, based on empirical
evidence, acknowledged the burden imposed by the waiting period, it
nonetheless found the waiting period to be constitutional and not a
substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions.1 34 Whereas, for the
spousal notification requirement, the Court used the empirical evidence
to find that the requirement posed a substantial obstacle.1 35 What is
concerning is that the Court did not give a clear explanation behind the
different findings except that for the waiting period was particularly
burdensome,136 and that the spousal notification was a substantial

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 864.
Id.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78.
Id. at 985-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

131. Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey In
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2032-33 (1994).

132.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 991 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Wihat is remarkable about the joint

opinion's fact-intensive analysis is that it does not result in any measurable clarification of the
'undue burden' standard.").

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id at 866 (majority opinion).
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 886.
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obstacle.' 3 7 This leaves open the question of what obstacle is enough to
show that the regulation has an effect of placing a substantial obstacle.
Another difference is that, for the spousal notification requirement,
the Court analyzed the burden based on the "one percent" that would be
affected by the regulation because they would be deterred due to fear for
their health, stating, "[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law
is irrelevant."1 38 Yet, the Court did not limit the relevant group for the
waiting period requirement to women who would have the fewest
financial resources, would have to travel long distances, and who would
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to their husbands.1 39 This is
despite the fact that the Court analyzed empirical evidence to show that
some women would be significantly deterred by the fear of assault from
their husbands because of the waiting period requirement.140 If one
percent of women would be deterred from seeking abortions due to the
fear of assault from notifying their husbands, would not the one percent
who would have to travel long distances and would have to hide their
whereabouts from their husbands because of fear also be deterred from
seeking abortion due to the fear of assault? Hence, as Professor
Chemerinsky points out, 14 1 the Court leaves open the issue of what class
of women the Court and the courts below should analyze in determining
whether "in a largefraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion."l 42
Further ambiguity arises because the Court neglected to analyze the
purpose prong while examining the Pennsylvania regulations, leaving
open a question: how to determine whether a law has the purpose of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion?
For the 24-hour waiting period, the Court articulated the State's purpose
as seeking to establish the informed consent of a woman and persuading
a woman to choose childbirth over abortion. 143 The Court did not inquire
whether that was the underlying purpose of the regulation. Instead, the
Court simply considered whether the regulation had an effect of placing
a substantial obstacle'" and whether the regulation met the rational basis
test.1 4 5 For the spousal notification requirement, the Court did not
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 893-94.
Id at 894.
See generally id. at 886-87.
See generally id. at 889-94.

141.

See CHEMERINSKY supra note Ill and accompanying text.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (emphasis added).
Id at 884-85.
Id at 885-87.
Id at 883.
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mention purpose and held that the spousal notification requirement would
impose a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortion. 14 6
However, one could argue that the Court analyzed the purpose prong in
the spousal notification requirement. The Court recognized that the
spousal "notification requirement relied on a conception of women as
subject to their husband's authority, a conception that is 'repugnant to our
present understanding of marriage and of nature of the rights secured by
the Constitution."'1 4 7 Thus, a statute that relies on an antecedent role of
women in society was unconstitutional, and hence had a purpose of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion.
But, the Court recognized no such purpose in the 24-hour waiting period
requirement despite the fact-as Justice Stevens points out-that the
statute relied on "the notion that a woman is less capable of deciding
matters of gravity," which is an old stereotype about a woman's ability
to make a rational decision on her own. 14 8
Finally, the Court fails to recognize the type of rationality review that
it must apply to meet the second part of the undue burden test. The Court
acknowledged that the word "liberty" in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy.1 4 9 The Court elaborated on the importance of liberty as "the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the state."so Further, the Court identified that a woman's
"suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.""s' Thus, the Court
placed a high degree of importance on a woman's ability to choose
whether to carry the pregnancy to its full term. It would be a reasonable
deduction from the language used that the Court would apply a standard
more stringent than the deferential test utilized to evaluate economic
regulations.1 5 2 However, hints of deferential rational basisl5 3 can be
146.
147.

Id. at 894-95.
Metzger, supranote 131, at 2036 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 898).

148.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 918-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

149. Id. at 846 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
152. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("[A] state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy
by legislation adapted to its purpose.").
153. A law is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 111, at 565.
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observed throughout the plurality's dicta.15 4 Thus, one might argue that
the plurality only seeks to apply the most deferential standard of scrutiny
available under constitutional analysis.1 55 But, one might also argue that,
based on the importance of liberty, the Court intended to apply a more
stringent form of the rational basis test: rational basis with a bite.1 56 The
Court leaves open the possibility that it could apply deferential rational
basis or rational basis with a bite in the future.
However, the Court retains viability as a major point of importance. It
states, unequivocally, that "a State may not prohibit any woman from
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability."l

57

The rigidity of this law is apparent from lower court

decisions. When a federal or district court has heard cases placing a
blanket ban on pre-viability abortion,15 8 alll 5 9 but

twO1

60

Judges have

found the contested statute to be unconstitutional. Thus, statutes that do
not define viability as a point beyond which a State can place a blanket
ban on abortion are unconstitutional.
Hence, the plurality leaves several open issues because of its
inconsistent and ambiguous application of the undue burden standard.
First, it does not clarify how courts should determine whether the State
had a purpose of placing a substantial obstacle on a woman seeking an
abortion. Second, it does not precisely define "substantial obstacle" or
instruct judges how to identify such a barrier to an abortion. Third, the
Court does not define the class of woman (all or a portion) that courts
154.

"[A] state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be

upheld if reasonably relatedto that goal." Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (emphasis added). "[R]equiring
that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and
the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable

measure to ensure an informed choice. . . ." Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 111, at 565 ("The minimal level of review is the 'rational
basis test."').
156. See Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 294 (2013) ("[T]he Casey

Court's language indicated that the bite's searching inquiry into state interests is most suitable for
effective undue burden analysis.").

157.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.

158.

An example of such a ban is the Arizona statute struck down by the Ninth Circuit in

Issacson v. Home, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013). The statute provides in relevant part, "a
person shall not knowingly perform, induce, or attempt to perform or induce an abortion on a
pregnant woman if the probable gestational age of her unborn child has been determined to be at
least twenty weeks." Aiz. REV. STAT.

§

36-2159 (held unconstitutional by Issacson v. Home,

716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013)).
159. See, e.g., Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1117 (8th Cir. 2015); MIKB Mgmt. Corp.
v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015); 1ssacson, 716 F.3d at 1231; Edwards v. Beck,
946 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (E.D. Ark. 2013); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059,
1074 (D. N.D. 2014); MLKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900, 912 (D. N.D. 2013).
160. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 873 (D. Utah 1992); Issacson v. Home, 884 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 971 (D. Ariz. 2012).
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should consider when determining the burden a law imposes. Finally, the
Court does not distinguish between the strong and ordinary rational basis
review. These ambiguities have resulted in two possible types of review
under the undue burden test: (1) deferential undue burden; and (2) undue
burden with a bite. 161 The room for flexible application of undue burden
has rendered many abortion rulings by the federal courts inherently
political. 162

B. Deferential Undue Burden v. Undue Burden with a Bite
A deferential undue burden test consists of a purpose prong, an effect
prong, and rational basis that is deferential. An undue burden with a bite
test consists of a purpose prong, an effect prong, and rational basis that is
less deferential. As shown below, Circuit Courts, as well as the Supreme
Court, apply either of those two tests on a spectrum (i.e., either leanin
toward undue burden with a bite or toward deferential undue burden).16
1. Purpose Prong
As discussed in Part II.A, the Supreme Court largely neglects the
purpose prong during its analysis.' 64 In cases after Casey, the Court has
failed to articulate a purpose prong test. In CarhartI, the majority did not
analyze the purpose prong and the only instance in which the majority
uses the term "purpose" is to define the applicable standard. 6 5 In
Mazurek v. Armstrong,166 the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's
decision because the court did not "rely on any evidence suggesting an
unlawful motive on the part of the Montana Legislature." 6 71in reversing
the decision, the Court rejected two theories that the lower court held
showed improper purpose. First, the lower court found improper purpose
because there was no medical reason supporting the statute.1 6 8 Second,
the court found improper purpose because the law was drafted by an antiabortion group. 169 The Court, however, did not articulate a standard for
161.

See discussion infra Part II.B.

162.
163.
164.

See discussion infra Part f11.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1-3.
See discussion supra Part [l.A.

165. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) ("An 'undue burden is ...
shorthand conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.').

166.

520 U.S. 968 (1997).

167. Id at 976.
168. Id. at 972 (rejecting respondent's claim that since there was no medical reason
supporting the physician-only restriction, the purpose must have been unlawful).

169.

Id. at 973 (holding that there was nothing significant about the legislature's purpose in

passing a law drafted by anti-abortion group).

450

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 28

determining improper purpose.
In Gonzalez v. Carhart(CarhartJJ),170 the Court, without undergoing
a purpose analysis, found the contested Act's purpose in recitals
preceding the Act's operative provision.' 7 ' The Court found that the
legislature enacted the law out of respect for the dignity of human life.1 7 2
The Court manufactured a second governmental purpose: helping women
make informed decisions.1 7 3 Unlike the first governmental purpose, the
second purpose was not derived from the Act's operative provision.
Rather, as Justice Ginsburg contends, the Court "invokes an antiabortion
shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who
have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from
'[s]evere depression and loss of esteem."'1 7 4 Hence, the Court in Carhart
II failed to articulate a test to determine the purpose of a statute. Finally,
in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,1 75 the Court limited its
arguments to the effect prong and the rational basis analysis.17 6
Casey and its progeny give no guidance on how to determine an
invalid purpose. Therefore, the lower courts are left to determine the test
for analyzing the purpose prong. This has led to different circuits
applying different tests, which has resulted in two forms of the purposeprong test: one that is deferential and one with a bite. First, I will discuss
the deferential purpose prong. Next, I will discuss the purpose prong with
a bite.
The Seventh Circuit has used the deferential purpose-prong test. In
Karlin v. Foust,17 7 the court held that a challenge on the grounds that a
regulation was enacted with an impermissible purpose "will rarely be
successful, absent ... [an] explicit indication from the state that it was
acting in furtherance of an improper purpose." 7 8 According to the court,
the rule was obvious because of the lack of guidance in Casey and
Mazurek. The court heavily relied on the legislature's definition of

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
See id.
188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 493. However, another Seventh Circuit decision did not use the deferential

purpose test. In Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, Judge Posner, although the
purpose of the statute was not at issue, acknowledged the state's interest in protecting the mother's

health, but looked at other factors to discern the purpose. 738 F.3d 786, 790-91 (7th Cir. 2013).
Such factors include a two-day deadline for obtaining admitting privileges, an absence of any

medical benefit from requiring doctors who perform abortions to have such privileges, deferential
treatment of abortion vis-a-vis medical procedures at least as dangerous as abortions, and the

existence of a private civil remedy for violations. Id.
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.

"intended purpose" in determining whether the purpose was
impermissible and held that the court's inquiry into legislative purpose is
necessarily deferential and limited. 179 Further, the court stated that the
plaintiff s argument for an impermissible purpose would have merit if the
legislature expressly states that the Act's purpose was to limit a woman's
right to have an abortion or if this fact was clear on the face of the Act.' 8 0
To demonstrate when an impermissible purpose is clear on its face, the
court cited to a Tenth Circuit case, where the State, by making abortion
illegal after twenty weeks, had ignored the Supreme Court's directive that
viability is a matter for an attending physician to determine. 18 ' Thus, it
can be inferred from the court's reasoning that under its purpose-prong
test an act will be permissible if the legislature defines a permissible
purpose, does not create laws that place a complete ban on pre-viability
abortions, and is careful to never state that the act is meant to limit
abortion. If the state meets these requirements, the court will not inquire
into the purpose. This places a high burden of proof on the plaintiffs, and
in the court's own words, "such a challenge will rarely be successful."l 82
The court's reasoning makes this test highly deferential to the state
legislature and effectively forecloses any improper purpose challenge.
The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all utilized a more
searching "with a bite" test. The Fifth Circuit has articulated what could
be named the "sham" test.1 83 Under this test, a court should afford
significant deference to a government's articulation of the purpose, unless
it is a mere "sham." 184 The court should look at "the language of the
challenged act, its legislative history, the social and historical context. .
or other legislation concerning the same subject matter as the challenged
18
This test is different from the one used by the Seventh
measure."a
Circuit because the court explicitly rejects the idea that a purpose is
impermissible only if admitted by the legislature for such a purpose.' 8 6
Further, it is evident by the court's reasoning that the "sham" test is less
deferential. The court acknowledged the State's defined purpose: to
inform a woman of all risks associated with having an abortion.1 87 But
unlike the Seventh Circuit, it conducted an independent review of the
stated purpose and explained that "it is undeniable that the provision
[was] designed ... to ensure that a physician [could not] insulate himself
179.
180.
181.

Karlin, 188 F.3d at 496.
Id.
Id.

182.

Id. at 493.

183.

Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999).

184.

Id.

185.
186.

Id. at 354-55.
Id. at 355.

187.

Id at 356.
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. associated with

abortion" rather than to inform a woman.1 8 8 Thus, the "sham" test is a
purpose prong test with a bite.
The Ninth and the Tenth Circuits have articulated the "predominant
factor" test. The Ninth Circuit articulated this test in Armstrong v.
Mazurek,189 where it stated that "[l]egislative purpose to accomplish a
constitutionally forbidden result may be found when that purpose was
'the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision."' 90 The
predominant factor may be determined from the structure of the
legislation and from an examination of the process that led to its
191 rmstong
es192
enactment.191 Citing to Armstrong,
the Tenth Circuit adopted this test.
Unlike the test used by the Seventh Circuit, a court using the predominant
factor test would have to conduct an independent judicial review of the
process and the structure of the legislation. For example, one of the
factors the Tenth Circuit found persuasive in holding the purpose to be
impermissible was that the legislature had established a litigation trust
account. 193 The Seventh Circuit would not conduct such an analysis
because the legislature had defined their purposes and the court would
have been deferential to those purposes.
Finally, the Eight Circuit adopted a less deferential test than the one
articulated by the Seventh Circuit. Even though the court did not define
a test for determining legislative purpose, it did not show any deference
to the State's interest. 194 Rather, the Court conducted an independent
review. It looked at the facts, which showed discrimination against
abortion facilities and lack of explanation for new enforcement.1 9 5 This
analysis of the purpose prong mandates a judicial review of the purpose
of an act, which is not what the deferential purpose test of the Seventh
Circuit requires.
In sum, the primary difference between the purpose-prong test with a
bite and the deferential purpose-prong test is independent judicial review.
For a deferential test, the court will not conduct an independent review
but will defer to the stated purpose. For a bite test, the court will conduct
an independent review regardless of the stated purpose.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
1997).
195.

Id. at 356-57.
94 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 567 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)).
Id.
Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir.
Id. at 1049.
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2. Effect Prong
The effect prong of the undue burden test suffers from ambiguity for
two reasons: (1) the Court's failure to describe when an obstacle becomes
substantial and (2) the Court's failure to give a definite answer as to what
the relevant group is in determining whether, in a large fraction of cases,
the statute places a substantial obstacle. 196 However, the Casey plurality
made it obvious that if a statute prevents a large fraction of women from
obtaining an abortion, it has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of women seeking an abortion. 1 9 By drawing the line at viability,
the Court made it apparent that a complete ban on pre-viability abortion
is also unconstitutional.19 8 Thus, it could be argued that a complete
prevention of abortion for a large fraction of women from a relevant
group would mean that the law has an effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion, and hence make it
unconstitutional. Therefore, determining the relevant group could be the
threshold for finding a law unconstitutional.
Based on the importance of defining a relevant group, the lower courts
and Supreme Court have created two versions of this test. One test is the
broad relevant group test; the other is the narrow relevant group test. It
logically follows that if the relevant test is narrow, and thus the group is
smaller, it would be easier to show that a large fraction of that group will
be prevented from getting abortions. The opposite is true for the broad
relevant group test. First, I will discuss the broad relevant test and then
the narrow relevant test.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted the broad relevant group test. In Planned
Parenthoodof GreaterTexas SurgicalHealth Services v. Abbott (Abbott
1),199 the court, in analyzing the admitting privileges requirement, found
that the relevant group was all women seeking an abortion in Texas
because the requirement applied to all abortion facilities in the state. 2 0 0
The court could have limited the relevant group to the 40 percent of
women below the poverty line who seek an abortion, or to the group of
women in the Texas Panhandle who would have to travel 400 to 500
miles for an abortion. 2 0 1 In a subsequent opinion relating to a petition for
rehearing, the dissent points out that the court could have narrowed the
relevant group to women "who are forced to travel vast distances and

196.

See discussion supra Part II.A.

197.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-96 (1992).

198.

See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.

199.
200.
201.
F.3d 330,

748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 600.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott il), 769
347 (5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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incur prohibitive traveling costs to access abortion services." 202 Thus, in
its calculus for the relevant groups, the court included women who would
not be affected by the law, either because they are wealthy enough to
travel or because they live within a short distance of a clinic that was
open.
The Fifth Circuit's approach in including women not affected by the
law is even more apparent in Whole Woman 's Health v. Lakey. 203 Similar
to Abbott I, the court found the relevant group to be every woman seeking
an abortion in Texas.204 The rationale for its holding was that the
ambulatory center requirement applied to all facilities and, hence, all
women were affected by it.205 The plaintiffs argued that the relevant
group consisted only of women who could have accessed abortion
services prior to implementation of the law, but would face increased
obstacles as a result of the law; however, the Court found the argument
to be too narrow. 206 In choosing a relevant group, the court ignored, inter
alia, the expert witness's testimony that only one out of six women
seeking an abortion will live more than 150 miles from the nearest
clinic.2 0 7 Furthermore, the court included women who would not be
affected by the law since those women live near the seven or eight clinics
that would be open after the implementation of the law. 20 8
The majority in CarhartII also adopted the broad relevant group
standard. The majority, in upholding the partial birth abortion act, found
that the respondent had failed to show that the ban on intact D&E "would
be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases." 2 W As Justice
Ginsburg argues in her dissent, the Court failed to apply a narrower
test. 2 10 Justice Ginsburg and the other three dissenting Justices would
have applied the narrow relevant group test. Unlike the majority's broad
relevant group test, which included every woman seeking an abortion, the
relevant group for the dissenters would have been "women who, in the
judgment of their doctors, require an intact D&E because other
procedures would place their health at risk." 2 1 1 As shown below, the
Seventh and the Ninth Circuits have used this test.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 361.
Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. See generally Abbott 1, 748 F.3d 583.
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299.
Id.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 300.
Gonzalez v. Carhart (CarhartII), 550 U.S. 124, 167-68 (2007).
Id. at 188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("But Casey makes clear that, in determining

whether any restriction poses an undue burden on a 'large fraction' of women, the relevant class
is not 'all women,' nor 'all pregnant women,' nor even all women 'seeking abortions.').

211.

Id.
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Judge Posner, in PlannedParenthoodof Wisconsin v. Doyle,2 12 found
the ban on partial birth abortion unconstitutional.2 1 3 He reasoned that the
fact that D&X procedures are rare is irrelevant because "a woman whose
health depends on it will not be comforted to learn that Wisconsin has
decided to ban the procedure because only a few women need it and so
the state can make a low-cost statement of opposition to abortion
rights." 2 14 Although not explicitly stated, it is logical to assume from
Judge Posner's statement that in deciding the relevant group, he only
considered women who needed the D&X procedure because of health
reasons rather than all women seeking abortions, or even all women
seeking second trimester abortions.
The Ninth Circuit, in its most recent abortion decision, also adopted a
narrow relevant group approach. In McCormack v. Herzog,215 the
majority rejected the State attorney's assertion that since the number of
second trimester non-surgical abortions was quite small, the law does not
create a substantial obstacle. 2 16 Instead, the court stated that "[t]he
percentage of non-surgical second trimester abortions is certainly small,
but for 'a large fraction of the cases in which [the statute] is relevant,'
required hospitalization will operate as a substantial obstacle." 2 17 Thus,
the court looked at a narrower group: women who needed non-surgical
second trimester abortions, rather than all women requiring abortions or
all women requiring second term abortions.
Besides the use of different relevant groups in analyzing the effect
prong, the circuit courts, before the Supreme Court's decision in
Hellerstedt, were split on how to analyze the effect prong. In Hellerstedt,
the Court officially adopted a balancing test.2 18 Under this test, a court is
required to consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer. 2 1 9 Before Hellerstedt, the
Fifth Circuit, in Lakey, invalidated the balancing test employed by the
district. 22 0 Judge Elrod found that standard erroneous because, in the Fifth
Circuit, the court does "not balance the wisdom or effectiveness of a law

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 469.
788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1030.
Id.
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
Id.
Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 296-97 (5th Cir. 2014) ("The district

court also erred when it balanced the efficacy of the ambulatory surgical center provision against

the burdens the provision imposed."). See also Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine,
696 F.3d 490, 515 (6th Cir. 2012) (McKeague, J., concurring in part and writing the majority as
to Part VI); Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
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against the burdens the law imposes." 221 The Seventh and the Ninth
Circuit adopted the balancing test. Judge Posner stated, "[t]o determine
whether the burden imposed by the statute is 'undue' (excessive), the
court must 'weigh the burdens against the state's justification .... If a
burden significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state's
interests, it is undue."'222 In implementing this standard, Judge Posner
cited to a Ninth Circuit decision, which also adopted the balancing test. 223
The balancing test "ratchets up rational basis review into pseudo-strictscrutiny approach by examining whether the law advances the State's
asserted purpose."22 Thus, the balancing test is a less deferential test.
Finally, Judge Posner has created a novel approach to the effect prong
analysis. Under this approach, "[w]hen one abortion regulation
compounds the effects of another, the aggregate effects on abortion rights
must be considered." 225 In PlannedParenthoodof Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van
Hollen, Judge Posner looked, along with the challenged law, at a law
already in effect in Wisconsin and found that the compound effects of the
two laws created an undue burden. 226 This approach has been called the
cumulative effect test. 2 2 7

In conclusion, the deferential effect prong test consists of a broad
relevant group, lacks a cumulative effect test, and consists of an arbitrary
test where the judges will "highlight certain facts in the record . .. [and]
after describing these facts ... announce[] that the provision either does
or does not impose a 'substantial obstacle' . . . ."228 In contrast, the effect
prong with a bite consists of a narrower relevant group, a cumulative
effect test, and a balancing test.
3. Rational Basis
As argued in Part II.A, the Supreme Court did not determine whether
a court should apply the strong or ordinary rational basis review in the
context of abortion related litigation. 229 Traditionally, the Supreme Court
has employed three tiers of scrutiny, one of which is rational basis. 230 The
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297.
Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2015).
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014).
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297.
Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. See also Metzger, supra note 131, at 2058-59 (1994) (arguing that the cumulative

effect principle that the Court has used in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is applicable to

abortion regulations).
227.

Metzger, supra note 131, at 2059.

228. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 991 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
229. See discussion supra Part IIA.
230. Freeman, supra note 156, at 282.
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Casey Court adopted rational basis review as a second part of the undue
burden test. 2 3 1 However, as early as 1972 the Court in some instances

applied what is now described as 'rational basis with a bite.' 232 When
courts apply traditional rational basis, referred to in this Article as
deferential rational basis, they presume legislative legitimacy and require
a superficial nexus between the means and end; the courts that employ
rational basis with a bite scrutinize the actual nature of the State's interest,
and thoroughly assess its relationship to the statute. 23 3 As shown below,
the Supreme Court and the lower courts have used both of these tests in
the context of abortion related litigation. First, I will discuss deferential
rational basis, and then discuss rational basis with a bite.
The Fifth Circuit and the majority in Carhart H adopted the
deferential rational basis test. According to the Fifth Circuit, the rational
basis test seeks only to determine whether any conceivable rationale
exists for an enactment and hence "does not lend itself to an evidentiary
inquiry in court ... ."234 Thus, a law meets the rational basis standard if
it is based on "rational speculation" even if the speculation is
"unsupported by evidence or empirical data." 235 The court explicitly
differentiated rational basis review from empirical basis review. 236 The
rationale for such a deferential test, the court reasoned, is the separation
of powers. 237 Therefore, under the Fifth Circuit's rational basis test, a
court does not need to independently assess the relationship between the
State's interest and the means chosen using evidentiary hearings. Instead,
it must uphold the law even if the nexus between the means and end is
superficial or speculative.
Justice Ginsburg's scathing rebuttal of the majority's opinion makes
it clear that the majority in CarhartII adopted the deferential rational
basis. One of the interests furthered by the State was protecting the life
of a fetus that may become a child.23 The majority found that the law
would further such an interest. 239 However, Justice Ginsburg pointedly
noted the presence of a superficial nexus analysis in the majority opinion
when she wrote, "the Act scarcely furthers that interest: The law saves
231.
232.

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
Freeman, supra note 156, at 285.

233.

Id.

234.

F.3d 583,
235.
236.
237.
238.

Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott 1), 748

594 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id
Id at 596.
Id. at 594.
Gonzalez v. Carhart (CarhartII), 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) ("[W]e must determine

whether the Act furthers the legitimate interests of the Government in protecting the life of the

fetus that may become a child.").
239. Id at 160 ("It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation ...
[would be] reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions.").
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not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of
performing abortion." 240 An interest that concerned Justice Kennedy was
ensuring that women are well-informed before they seek late-term
abortions. 2 4 1 As Emma Freeman points out, the State's chosen regulatory
means poorly matched the Court's articulated regulatory end (informed
decision).24 2 One would assume that if the legitimate interest was to
provide adequate information, pre-procedure information regulation
would suffice. However, the majority upheld a ban on the entire
procedure. 2 4 3 It is hard to comprehend how criminalizing an entire
procedure244 furthers the State's interest in making sure a woman seeking
an abortion is well informed. If the majority had thoroughly assessed the
relationship between the means chosen to achieve the end, as Justice
Ginsburg and Emma Freeman do, they "might have held that the Act was
ill-tailored to suit the government's interest. "245
In Hellerstedt, the majority seems to have adopted rational basis with
a bite test. Justice Breyer, in rejecting the Fifth Circuit's approach to the
undue burden standard, stated that it is "wrong to equate the judicial
review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected
personal liberty with the less strict review applicable where, for example,
economic legislation is at issue." 246 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, which
rejected an invitation for evidentiary inquiry, the majority relied on the
247
independent fact finding by the district court. It also relied on empirical
data. For example, for the admitting privileges requirement, the Court
relied on the evidence of the number of complications that arise due to
abortion, when the complications arise, and where the women seeking
hospitalization due to complications might go. 2 4 8 Similarly, for the
surgical center requirement, the majority compared complications that
arise from abortion with those that arise from other procedures. 2 4 9 If the
majority had adopted the speculative analysis of the Fifth Circuit, it might
have ruled otherwise. It is an empirical-heavy analysis, along with the
searching review of the means chosen to reach the end, which makes the
majority analysis far more stringent than the one applied by the Fifth
Circuit, or by the Court in Carhart11.250
240.

Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Freeman, supra note 156, at 317-18.

241.

Freeman, supra note 156, at 318.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
CarhartII, 550 U.S. at 150.
Freeman, supra note 156, at 318-21.
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
See generally id. at 2311-12, 2315-16.
Id. at 2311.
Id. at 2315.
Gonzalez v. Carhart (CarhartII), 550 U.S. 124, 186 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)

(Without any empirical data, Justice Kennedy speculatedthat "[w]omen who have abortions come
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Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit also rejected the Fifth Circuit's
rational basis standard, which differentiated between rational basis
review and empirical basis review. 2 51 He stated that "a statute that curtails
the constitutional right to an abortion . . . cannot survive challenge

without evidence that the curtailment is justifiable by reference to the
benefits conferred by the statute." 252 Thus, under Judge Posner's
standard, a court must, in the context of abortion, review the legislative
findings independently and make a decision based on empirical data
rather than mere speculation. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
Fifth Circuit's deferential rational basis analysis. 2 53
HI. UNDUE BURDEN: NOTMNG BUT POLITICS

In his dissent in Casey, Justice Scalia called the undue burden test
"inherently manipulable." 254 In CarhartI, he correctly noted that the
undue burden standard "cannot be demonstrated true or false by factual
inquiry or legal reasoning." 2 55 Rather, the conclusion of whether a
regulation has the effect or purpose of placing a substantial obstacle
depends on whether a judge stems from the pro-life or the pro-choice
group. 256 The inherent flexible nature of the undue burden test as

described in Part II.B 2 57 enables judges to use the standard in order to
reach a conclusion based on ideology, as opposed to reaching a
conclusion by using the standard.
Justice Scalia's skeptical view of the undue burden test, and hence a
judge's ability to separate himself from his political or ideological view,
is well founded. Based on the data shown below, it is reasonable to
conclude that Chief Justice Marshall's optimistic view of the judiciary 2 58
is naive and the Constitution's separation of power doctrine is violated in
to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from '[s]evere depression and loss of esteem."').

251.
252.
253.

Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014) ("We

conclude that Abbott ... [is] inconsistent with the undue burden test as articulated and applied in
Casey and Gonzale[z].").

254.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985-86 (1992) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) (Joint opinions "efforts at clarification make clear only that the standard is inherently

manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable in practice.").
255. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914, 954-55 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Id. ("It is a value judgment, dependent upon how much one respects . . . the life of a
partially delivered fetus, and how much one respects ... the freedom of the woman who gave it

life to kill it.").
257.

See supra Part U.B.

258. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) ("Judicial power is never
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving
effect . . to the will of the law.").
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the context of abortion.
To prove the political or ideological nature of abortion jurisprudence,
I conducted an empirical study using cases related to abortion that were
decided by the circuit courts since Casey2 59 was decided in 1992. Cases
decided by the Supreme Court were not included in this study because
since Casey the Supreme Court has reviewed only three major2 W abortion
related decisions: Carhart J,261 Carhart II,262 and Hellerstedt.263
Conducting a study with only three cases would not be reliable. The
purpose of this analysis is to show that the flexible nature of the undue
burden standard gives judges enough discretion to derive a result that is
aligned with their political or ideological beliefs. Hence, cases where the
sole issue was whether an abortion-related statute violated the First
Amendment,2M the Eleventh Amendment,2 6 5 or the Equal Protection
Clause,266 were ignored.
In conducting this study, several assumptions were made: (1) Judges
adopt the political ideologies of the Presidents that nominate them. For
example, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit is listed as a Republican
because President Reagan nominated him.2 6 7 (2) Facts and reasoning are
irrelevant for abortion related decisions. This assumption is made because
of the vast number of cases that are analyzed. It would be hard, if not
impossible, to separate the nuances of every case. (3) Republicans are
pro-life, and Democrats are pro-choice. However, this is hardly an

259. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
260. The Court has heard other cases related to abortion. However, those cases do not
analyze the undue burden standard set forth in Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. Rather, those cases
discussed: (1) Application for stay and injunction pending appeal, Fargo Women's Health Org. v.
Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993); (2) Petition for certiorari, Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517
U.S. 1174 (1996), Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), Voinovich v. Women's Medical
Prof'1 Corp., 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); (3) First Amendment issue related to abortion, Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); (4) The proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found
unconstitutional, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); and (5) Application to
vacate stay, Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013).
261. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
262. Gonzalez v. Carhart (Carhart11), 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
263. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct 2292 (2016).
264. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
265. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2001).
266. See, e.g., Women's Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 412 (5th Cir. 2001).
267. A similar assumption was made by Professors Cross and Tiller when they conducted
an empirical study. They used the party of the appointing President as a proxy for a judge's
ideology. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourtofAppeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,2168 (1998); see
also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004) (Professors Cross and Tiller made a similar
assumption in their empirical study using the party appointing President as a proxy for a judge's
ideology.).
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assumption.2 6 8 (4) Home-state Senators do not significantly influence the
nomination of a judge by the President. While home-state Senators exert
nominees, 2 6 9 their
considerable influence on district court
recommendations for circuit court nominees compete with the name
suggested to the Administration by other sources," and are less
influential.2 70

Finally, the data used to reach the conclusion is provided in a blog. 2 7 1
I created the blog to make the data relied on available to the public. The
blog contains two attachments. The first one highlights all the cases used
and the second one highlights the results.
After conducting the study based on the steps and the assumptions
highlighted in Part III, the results indicate a stark difference between
judges nominated by Democratic Presidents (D-Judges) and judges
nominated by Republican Presidents (R-Judges). Out of 178 abortion
related laws that R-Judges voted on, they voted to uphold a law 118 times
and found a law to be unconstitutional 60 times. 2 7 2 In percentages, the RJudges voted to uphold a law 66% of the time and found a law
unconstitutional only 34% of the time. 2 7 3 Hence, an R-Judge is twice as
likely to uphold a law.
Out of 97 abortion related laws that D-Judges voted on, they voted to
uphold a law 15 times and found it unconstitutional 82 times. 2 74 in
percentages, a D-Judge voted to uphold 15% of the time and found it
unconstitutional 85% of the time. 27 Thus, a D-Judge is five times more
likely to find a law unconstitutional.
The near 50% difference between D-Judges and R-Judges, either for
upholding or finding a law unconstitutional, is stark. Based on this
difference, it is reasonable to conclude that if a State wants to defend the
constitutionality of an abortion law, the State would prefer a majority of
R-Judges on the bench. In contrast, a clinic that provides abortion
services would prefer a majority of D-Judges on the bench. It is
reasonable to conclude that the flexibility of the undue burden test has
resulted in judges determining whether a law has the effect or purpose of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion
268. Hannah Fingerhut, On Abortion, PersistentDivides Between - and Within - the Two
Parties, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Apr. 8, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/
08/on-abortion-persistent-divides-between-and-within-the-two-parties-2/.

269.

Hence, I have not included data from the district court decisions.

270.

DENIS RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34405, ROLE OF HOME STATE SENATORS IN

THE SELECTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES 20 (2002).

271.

Niraj Thakker, Federal Judges and Abortion, WORDPRESS (Jan. 14, 2017), https://

wordpress.com/read/feeds/59183133/posts/1298235479.
272.

Id (Look at attached document titled "District and Circuit Court Final Numbers.").

273.

Id.

274.

Id

275.

Id.
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based on their political or ideological beliefs.
These statistics are similar to a study done by Professors Sunstein,
Schkade and Ellman. 27 6 These Professors found evidence of ideological
voting in the context of abortion litigation. According to their study, DJudges cast pro-choice votes 70% of the time, compared to 49% for RJudges. 2 77

Further, this polarization in the context of abortion litigation can be
understood by Professors Shapiro and Levy's models of judicial
behavior. 278 According to the authors, there are two components of
judicial decision making: craft and outcome. 2 79 Therefore,
all judges prefer an outcome that coincides with their political and
ideological preferences; at the same time, all judges also prefer to
write an opinion that evidences good craftmanship, an opinion that
relies on accurate description and application of precedents and
doctrines. When the two conflict ... judicial behavior will depend
on two variables. First, a judge is more likely to choose outcome
over craft in a public law context with significant ideological
implications than in a private law context that does not raise
controversial public policy issues. Second, a judge is more likely
to choose outcome over craft in a decisionmaking context in which
the applicable doctrines are relatively indeterminate. 2 80
In the context of abortion litigation, it is clear that judges will choose
outcome over craft. -It is evident from Professor Sunstein's article that
abortion has significant ideological implications. 28 1 Professor Sunstein
studied ideological voting of judges on the issues including "affirmative
action, campaign finance, federalism, the rights of criminal defendants,
sex discrimination, piercing the corporate veil, racial discrimination,
property rights, capital punishment," sexual harassment, disability,
environmental regulation, contract clause violations, Title VII, criminal
appeals, and the commerce clause, takings, abortion and.2 82 Professor
Sunstein found no ideological amplification or dampening, only that on
the issues of abortion and capital punishment. 283 Ideological dampening
is a phenomenon whereby "[a] judge's ideological tendency . . . [is]
dampened if she is sitting with two judges of a different political
276.
277.

Sunstein, supra note 267, at 327.
Id. at 328.

278. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review ofAdministrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1052 (1995).

279.
280.
281.

Id. at 1053.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is StandingLaw or Politics, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1745 (1999).
Id.

282.

Sunstein, supra note 267, at 304-06.

283.

Id. at 327.
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party." 2 84 In contrast, under ideological amplification, "[a] judge's
ideological tendency ... [is] likely to be amplified if she is sitting with
two judges from the same political party." 2 85 This led Professor Sunstein
to conclude that judges have strongly held ideological beliefs about
abortion. 2 8 6 Thus, the first criteria of the Shapiro-Levy judicial decisionmaking is met in the context of abortion litigation.
The second criteria of the Shapiro-Levy judicial decision-making
model is also met in the context of abortion litigation. As shown in Part
II, the doctrine of undue burden is relatively indeterminate. 2 8 7 A judge
has broad discretion to choose a standard across the spectrum. For
example, an R-Judge could uphold a law if she uses a deferential purpose
prong, broad relevant group, or deferential rational basis. On the other
hand, a D-Judge can invalidate the same law if she uses a purpose prong
with a bite, a narrow relevant group, or rational basis with a bite.

IV. SOLUTION: NARROWING THE SCOPE OF UNDUE BURDEN

"The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that
they are deemed to be 'fundamental rights."' 288 These fundamental rights
arise from "the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and/or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2 89 These rights protect "family autonomy, procreation,
sexual activity and sexual orientation, medical care decision making,
travel, voting, access to the courts, and the right to bear arms." 29 0 Almost
all of these rights are scrutinized under the strict scrutiny standard. 2 9 1
Thus, if a State wants to infringe on the majority of these rights, it would
have to show that the means chosen are "necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose." 292 However, a notable exception to
this rule is abortion.
Abortion is a fundamental right.29 3 No Supreme Court or circuit court
decision has held otherwise. However, since Casey, this fundamental
right is treated differently than almost all other fundamental rights. 2 9 4
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 304.
Id.
Id at 335.

287.
288.

See supra Part II.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 111, at 826.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). Abortion as a fundamental right is most

clearly stated in Justice Stewarts's concurring opinion. Id. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).

294.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (rejecting strict
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While the burden of proof is on the State to overcome the strict scrutiny
standard for a majority of cases involving fundamental rights, the Casey
court shifted the burden of proof to the person whose rights have been
infringed. 2 95 By articulating a standard where the State must only
overcome the most deferential standard,2 9 6 rational basis, to successfully
infringe on a woman's right to abortion, the Court, in the guise of
balancing a State's interest with that of a woman seeking abortion, has
given the majority-the State-the ability to infringe on the liberty
interest of the minority-women. This extremely deferential standard for
the states and overwhelming burden on the woman seeking to protect her
liberty interest is obvious in the cases where courts apply the deferential
undue burden test. Under this test, a State can speculate, provide no
empirical data, and still meet its burden of proof: rational basis. 2 9 7
Alternatively, the woman must wait for the State to concede an
impermissible purpose 2 9 8 and must show, through fact intensive proof,2 9 9
that the arbitrary test of "substantial obstacle" is met for a broad relevant
group.

300

While strict scrutiny would be ideal for abortion related cases because
of its fundamental nature, it would be futile to argue for it. Undue burden
has been the standard for 25 years, and the recent presidential, and
congressional elections foreclose the hope for strict scrutiny. 3 0 1 Thus, the
solution provided below suggests a more heightened, and less flexible
undue burden standard, which will ratchet up the standard to pseudo strict
scrutiny. Under the solution provided, a State's legitimate interests would
be limited. Further, to evaluate an abortion law the court would adopt the
undue burden with a bite standard. To analyze the effect prong using the
balancing test, a court would use the factors adopted by the Ninth Circuit
and Judge Thompson. This test would narrow the discretion of the judges
by making it a fact intensive and less flexible test that would minimize a
judges' ability to reach ideological conclusions.
Thus, under the standard described below, a State does not have a
legitimate interest in protecting potential life before viability. 3 0 2
However, a State has an interest in protecting potential life subject to the

scrutiny applied in Roe, and adopting the undue burden standard).

295.

See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text

296.
297.
298.
299.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 111, at 566.
See discussion supra II.B.3.
See discussion supra 11.B. 1.
Caitlin E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation, It's the Facts That Matter, 127 HARv. L.

REv. F. 149, 149(2014).
300.
301.

See discussion supra 1.B.2.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.

302. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (viability is the
bright line that the Supreme Court has drawn in Casey).
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health and life exception for women post-viability.30 3 A State must first
show that the law is rationally related to its legitimate interest. If a State
successfully shows that then the Court must undertake an independent
judicial review of whether the purpose of the statute is permissible. If the
independent judicial review finds that the purpose is permissible, the
Court must then review the effect of the law, and determine, under the
balancing test, whether the burden placed on women due to the law
outweighs the benefit conferred by the law, ergo making the law unduly
burdensome.
A. EliminatingState Interest in PromotingPotentialLife Pre-Viability
Casey recognized two legitimate state interests: (1) preserving and
protecting the health of the pregnant woman (women's health interest), 304
and (2) promoting the life or potential life of the unborn throughout the
pregnancy (potential life interest).30 5 Under the second interest
recognized, a State may enact laws to ensure that a woman's choice is
thoughtful and informed.30 6 The justification for "informed abortion" can
be found in Carhart II.307 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
states, "While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptional to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained ... Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow." 308 It is this hypothetical risk,
based on no data, that gives a State the legitimate interest in ensuring that
the choice is well informed. 3 0 9 The potential life interest also gives a State
the legitimate interest in persuading women seeking an abortion to choose
childbirth over abortion.310
The Casey plurality recognized a State's interest in potential life
because Roe v. Wade clearly established such an interest. 3 11 This has
created two sub-categories of state interests that are recognized as
legitimate: (1) ensuring that a woman's choice is thoughtful and
informed, and (2) persuading women to choose childbirth over
abortion.31 2 As shown below, these two sub-categories are seriously
303. Id. at 879 ("[T]he State in promoting its interest in potential human life may ...
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary ... for preservation of the life
or health of the mother.").

304.
305.
306.

Id. at 875-76.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 872.

307.

Gonzalez v. Carhart (CarhartIl), 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).

308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
See id
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
Id. at 871.

312.

See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
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flawed.
Justice Kennedy's rationale 3 13 for why states have a legitimate interest
in making sure that the woman's choice is informed places women back
into the world of Myra Bardwell, 3 14 where a woman lacks intellectual or
moral capacity, cannot be assumed to know her own best interest, and
whose "paramount destiny and mission . . . [is] to fulfill the noble and

benign offices of wife and mother." 315 As Justice Stevens points out, this
legitimate interest relies on "the notion that a woman is less capable of
deciding matters of gravity." 316 The Casey Court explicitly rejected the
antecedent role of a woman as subject to her husband's authority while
striking down the spousal notification requirement, 317 but it failed to
recognize an equally repugnant myth that woman are incapable of making
informed decisions. While acknowledging that a choice to "have an
abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision,"31 s the Court
assumed that women are incapable of making such decisions and that the
State needs to inform them of the consequences. As the Court has left
behind the myth that the "paramount destiny and mission ... of women
[is] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother," 319 it must
also leave behind the notion that women are incapable of making grave
decisions that affect their "economic and social life" 320 without
interference from the State.
Casey explicitly recognized a State's interest in persuading a woman
to choose childbirth over abortion. 3 2 1 This, however, is contradictory to
the "liberty" the majority in Casey speaks of. In the context of abortion,
the majority stated:
[A woman's] suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to
insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history
and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and

313.

See supra note 307 and accompanying text.

314. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (discussing common-law and traditional
distinction between roles and destinies of men and women).
315. Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of
a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 43 (2008).
316. Casey, 505 U.S. at 918-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.

318.

Gonzalez v. Carhart (Carhartl),550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).

319. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (discussing the common-law and traditional distinction
between roles and destinies of men and women).

320.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.

321.

Id at 878.
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her place in society. 322
In allowing states to persuade women to choose childbirth over
abortion, the Court gives states free reign to force their conception of
spirituality on women seeking an abortion; to replace a woman's moral
code with their own. Further, this "paternalism undermines the
independence of women as decisionmakers" and bolsters the stereotype
that women make decisions emotionally and irrationally and are easily
swayed by authority figures. 32 3 While recognizing the obvious spousal
coercion, 324 the Court failed to recognize the more subtle form of
coercion in states aggressively persuading women to change their minds
about abortion. 32 5 As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent, a State must
not be able to "inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its own
views of what is best. The State may promote its preferences by funding
childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by
espousing the virtues of family; but it must respect the individual's
freedom to make such judgments." 32 6
A State's legitimate interest in making sure a woman seeking an
abortion is well informed, and its legitimate interest in persuading women
has led to twenty-seven states requiring women to wait twenty-four hours
or more before getting an abortion. 32 7 This is despite the fact that 92% of
women seeking abortions have their mind made up prior to making an
appointment. 328 Thus, a State's legitimate interest in making sure that a
woman's decision is informed, and being able to persuade women to
choose childbirth, serves no purpose. Rather, it only functions as a delay.
The laws passed because of these interests are detrimental to a woman's
emotional and mental health.3 2 9 In recognizing the legitimacy of these
interests, the Court legitimizes an antiquated notion of a woman's
character and role, and recognizes an interest that serves no purpose, and
is detrimental to a woman's health. Thus, the Court should not recognize
a State's interest in persuading a woman to choose childbirth over
abortion, or in ascertaining that a woman's choice is informed as
legitimate. Hence, by extension, a court must not recognize a State's
interest in promoting potential life before viability as legitimate. Rather,
if information regarding a woman's health is necessary, it can be
322. Id. at 852.
323. Paula Abrams, The TraditionofReproduction, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 453, 489 (1995).
324. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-97.
325. Abrams, supra note 323, at 489-90.
326. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327. Counseling and Waiting Periodsfor Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion.
328. Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 2017), https://www.
guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/waiting-periods-abortion#3a.
329. Id.
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scrutinized under a State's legitimate interest in protecting the health of
the mother.
B. Undue Burden with a Bite
The undue burden with a bite standard consists of a stronger
application of the rational basis, purpose prong, and effect prong of the
standard.3 30 Unlike the deferential undue burden that is akin to the
rational basis test, undue burden with a bite comes closer to higher levels
of scrutiny, such as intermediate and strict. The tougher nature of the
undue burden with a bite standard is apparent from its less deferential
rational basis test, 33 ' balancing and cumulative test for the effect prong,
a narrower relevant group, 332 and the requirement for an independent
judicial review of the purpose prong. 3 33 Unlike the deferential burden test,
which is extremely permissive for States and which places an
overwhelming burden on women seeking an abortion, the undue burden
with a bite test does not defer to States. This test also eases the barriers to
women who seek to challenge infringement of their fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy. In other words, this test better recognizes the
important status of abortion rights in the tradition of privacy protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Rational Basis with a Bite
While the purpose prong analyzes the end chosen3 34 and the effect
prong analyzes the consequences of the selected means, 33 5 rational basis
analyzes the nexus between the means and end. Thus, before analyzing
whether the end has an improper purpose or the means chosen place a
substantial burden, the Court should analyze whether there exists a
sufficient nexus between the means and the end. Stated differently, the
Court should assume a proper purpose (end) and assume no burden on a
woman because of the law (means).
Under the first filter, the Court need not inquire into the purpose (or
interest) of the statute because such an inquiry is better suited for the
purpose prong.3 36 This helps separate the rational basis review and the

330.

See discussionsupra Part II.B.

331.

See supra Part 11.B.3.

332.
333.

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.1.

334.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505. U.S. 833, 977 (1992) (analyzing whether the statute

was enacted for an improper purpose).

335. Id. at 877 (explaining that a "means chosen" statute is invalid if it "has the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice").
336. Id.
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purpose prong review. 3 3 7 A court must accept the interest, if legitimate,
proffered by the State. Thus, if a State contends that the statute is based
on protecting the health of a woman, the Court should, at this stage,
accept it as true. The sole inquiry under this filter is whether there is a
sufficient nexus between the statute and the legitimate interest or whether
the law is rationally related to the legitimate interest. The burden of proof
falls on the State to show such a nexus exists. For example, the State
would have to show that a statute that requires admitting privileges
(means) is rationally related to protecting women's health (end).
Since Marbury v. Madison,3 3 8 it has been the role of the judiciary to
elaborate constitutional law. 3 3 9 Judicial deference to other branches of
government is meant to bolster judicial legitimacy by preventing the court
from usurping the legislative power, 3 4 0 but deferential rational basis does
the opposite; and it produces bad law. 3 4 1 By allowing law supported only
by speculation and not evidence, the judiciary violates its most important
functions: protecting people from the abuses of the legislative power. 3 4 2
This is especially true when the liberty interest of minorities are at stake.
A standard that does not require a legislative body to provide any
empirical data supporting its assertion gives the legislative body
unchecked power to violate the fundamental rights of its citizens and
allows the legislative body to thwart the most important power of
judiciary: judicial review.
To remedy these problems, the Court should consistently apply the
rational basis with a bite test articulated by the majority in Hellerstedt
and by the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts.3 4 3 If a State either fails to
provide any empirical data to support the law or fails to articulate a
legitimate interest, the statute must be deemed unconstitutional.
However, if a State successfully fulfills the requirements, the statute
passes through the first filter and must be analyzed to see if it has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking an abortion.

337.

Courts have misconstrued the relationship between these two inquiries. See, e.g., Karlin

v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446,496 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that a regulation would survive the purpose
prong test if the act is reasonably designed to further a State's legitimate interest).
338. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
339. Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.").
340. Planned Parenthood v. Abbott (Abbott 1), 748 F.3d 583, 594 (5th Cir. 2014).
341. Aaron Belzer, Note, Putting the "Review" Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST.
U. L. REv. 339, 340 (2014).
342. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (declaring courts protect people
from abuse of legislative power).
343. See supra notes 246-53 and accompanying text
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2. Purpose Prong with a Bite
Purpose prong is the second filter through which a law must pass to
be deemed constitutional. While the Supreme Court has never articulated
a standard for purpose prong analysis in the context of abortion, it has
done so in other contexts.344 Under the deferential purpose prong test, a
plaintiff would have to hope for an unguarded legislature to concede to
an unconstitutional purpose. 34 5 The question then arises whether a court
should give such deference to the legislature. In the words of the circuit
court that articulated the deferential test, a plaintiff challenging the
purpose of the law under the deferential test "will rarely be successful." 3 4 6
Such deference would place an overwhelming burden on the plaintiff
seeking to protect his or her fundamental right. The Supreme Court, in
the context of the Establishment Clause, has struck down a law as
unconstitutional even though the State had argued a legitimate purpose. 3 4 7
There is no reason a court should not inquire into the actual purpose of
the statute in the context of abortion, where a State may argue for a
legitimate purpose, but legislative history reveals otherwise. Thus, the
Court should adopt the purpose prong with a bite standard.
Under the purpose prong with a bite standard, the Court should search
for the predominant factor motivating the legislative decision. 3 4 8 To
determine the predominant purpose, the Court should look at the
language of the act, its legislative history, the social and historical
context, or other legislation concerning the same subject matter as the
challenged measure. 3 4 9 These "consideration[s] of illicit objectives
[would] influence the outcome of the decision making process, [and]
encourag[e] more restrictive regulation" than would otherwise be
enacted, so thus limiting a State's ability to pass arbitrary laws.
Currently, there are twenty-three states that have laws or policies that
regulate abortion providers; sixteen states have onerous licensing
standards; and nineteen states have specific requirements for procedure

344. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1996) (discussing gerrymandering cases);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987) (discussing the Establishment Clause);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) (discussing facially neutral laws with
disparate impact).
345. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
346.
347.

See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
In Aguillard, the state argued that the Creationism Act served the legitimate purpose of

protecting academic freedom. 482 U.S. at 581-82. However, after undergoing a purpose prong
inquiry, the Court found that the law was not enacted for its stated purpose. Id. at 588-89.
348.
349.
350.

See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
Priscilla J. Smith, Ifthe Purpose Fits: The Two Functionsof Casey's Purpose Inquiry,

71 WASH. &LEE. L. REv. 1135, 1167(2014).
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rooms and corridors. 3 5 1 "Such regulations impose requirements on
abortion providers that are not imposed on other medical practices of
similar or even greater risk." 3 5 2 It is increasingly common for state health
and safety laws to single out abortion providers in this context. 3 53 With
this background, a purpose prong with a bite standard seems extremely
helpful in separating the constitutional from the unconstitutional.
Take for example an onerous licensing requirement which targets only
abortion providers, and the requirement does not affect other similarly
situated providers, such as a midwife who oversees childbirth in a
patient's home. Further, assume the State argues that the purpose of the
regulation is to protect women's health. Under the deferential purpose
prong standard, the inquiry would end, and the statute would pass the
filter. However, under the purpose prong with a bite, the court would look
at other legislation concerning similar objectives, such as protecting the
health of women and would find that the regulation does not apply to a
midwife, even though childbirth is fourteen times more likely than
abortion to result in death.3 54 Unless the State provides strong evidence
of proper purpose, the Court would likely hold the regulation as
unconstitutional.
3. Effect Prong with a Bite
The effect prong of the undue burden with a bite test consists of three
separate inquiries: (1) what is the relevant group of women to which the
law applies? (2) Whether the burden imposed by the law significantly
outweighs the benefits conferred by the law. (3) Whether the aggregate
burden of law at issue, when compounded with other laws in the books,
significantly outweighs the benefit conferred by the law at issue.
To determine the relevant group of women to which the law applies,
the Court should adopt the narrow relevant group test.35 5 Under this test,
the Court should look at the group that is affected by the law, rather than
the group to which the law applies. This approach is aligned with the
Court's reasoning in analyzing the spousal notification requirement in
Casey.3 5 6 In Casey, the Court could have adopted the broad relevant
group test of the Fifth Circuit3 5 7 by holding that the relevant groups were
all women seeking an abortion, or even all married women who seek
351. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers.
352. Linda Greenhouse, Reva B Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When "Protecting

Health" Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE. L.J. 1428, 1446 (2016).
353. Id.
354. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2315 (2016).
355.
356.

See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

357.

See supra note 199-208 and accompanying text.
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abortion because the law applies to both such groups. Under this test, the
Court would have undoubtedly found the spousal notification
requirement to be constitutional. If the Court had used all women seeking
abortion as the relevant group, the law would have deterred only one
percent of women seeking an abortion. 358 If the Court had used all
married women seeking abortion as the relevant group, the law would
have deterred only five percent of women seeking an abortion. 3 59 It seems
unlikely that one percent or five percent makes up the larger fraction 360
of women for whom the law is a burden. Thus, defining a relevant group
that is narrow would make it more likely for a plaintiff to show that a
large fraction of women are burdened by the law.
Once the relevant group is determined, the Court should highlight the
burdens imposed by the statute on that relevant group. The Court should
adopt a factor-based approach in determining the burdens a statute
imposes. The Ninth Circuit, and Judge Thompson, from the Middle
District of Alabama, have discerned such factors. These factors include:
(1) increase in the cost of abortion; (2) availability of abortion prior to
and under the challenged regulation; (3) delaying or deterring patients
obtaining abortion, and whether that delay increases health risk; (4) the
ways in which the law interacts with women's lived experience,
socioeconomic factors; (5) humiliation or emotional trauma to the woman
seeking abortion; and (6) likelihood of women seeking illegal abortions
because of the regulation, and the corresponding dangers to life and
health. 36 ' The burdens analyzed under these factors should then be
compared to the benefits the State proved in order to meet the rational
basis inquiry. The factor based analyses of the burden inquiry, along with
the balancing test should reduce a judges ability to conclude a law as
constitutional or unconstitutional based on his ideological or political
belief. The factor based analyses forces a judge to consider various
burdens a statute may impose on a woman seeking an abortion, and
precludes the judges from dismissing factors they find irrelevant.3 62
Finally, if the Court finds that the burden imposed by a statute does
not outweigh the benefit, the Court should consider the cumulative
burden imposed by considering the statute alongside preexisting laws or
the collective impact of numerous provisions within a single statute. The
358. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 895.
361. See generally Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 915 (9th Cir.
2014); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc., v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1288-90 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
362. See, e.g., June Medical Services v. Kleibert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 525 (M.D. La. 2016)
("Under the Fifth Circuit approach, however, poverty related issues . .. cannot be considered ....
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has found 'fear [of] anti-abortion violence' to be unrelated to the
abortion regulation at issue . . . .").

2017] UNDUE BURDEN WITHA BITE: SHIELDING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS FROM THE JAWS OFPOLITICS 473

importance of considering the cumulative effect can be highlighted using
Texas as an example. As of January 1, 2017, Texas had the following
restrictions on abortions: (1) a woman must receive state-directed
counseling, and must wait 24 hours before she can have the procedure;
(2) a woman must undergo an ultrasound before obtaining an abortion,
and the "provider must show and describe the image to the woman;" (3)
"medication abortion must be provided using FDA protocol;" (4) a parent
of a minor must provide consent and be notified before the minor can be
provided the abortion; (5) public funding is only available "in cases of
life endangerment, rape or incest;" and (6) "an abortion may be
performed at 20 or more weeks postfertilization only if the woman's life
is endangered, her physical health is severely compromised" or the
pregnancy is medically futile. 363
Suppose Texas enacts a law that results in closure of a clinic near a
certain group of women who now have to travel upwards of 150 miles to
reach the clinic. 3 6 In isolation, this law might not have the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle on women because the cost might not be
insurmountable to a large fraction of women. However, when viewed in
light of the ultrasound requirement, the informed consent requirement,
and the lack of public funding, the cost might reach an insurmountable
amount. Further, it is likely that if a woman who wants to keep her
procedure a secret from her husband due to fear of assault, would not be
able to travel the long distance, afford the extra cost, and be absent from
home for multiple days. It is also possible that the emotional toll of going
through counseling, obtaining an ultrasound, and enduring protests
outside abortion clinics 365 might adversely affect a woman's health. Thus,
it is important for the Court to consider the cumulative effect of abortion
laws in a State.
Thus, the combination of rational basis with a bite, searching purpose
prong inquiry, narrow relevant group, balancing test, and cumulative test
makes undue burden with a bite a plaintiff friendly standard. The standard
increases the burden of a State and simultaneously makes it more likely
for the plaintiff to show that the right to abortion has been infringed.

363. State Facts About Abortion: Texas, GuTrMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/
fact-sheet/state-facts-about-abortion-texas (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).

364. This is what happened in Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 298 (5th
Cir. 2014).
365. Liz Welch, 6 Women on Their Terrifying, InfuriatingEncounters with Abortion Clinic
Protesters, COSMOPOLITAN, http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a5669/abortion-clinicprotesters/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
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CONCLUSION

The central argument in this Article has been that the undue burden
standard has given judges the ability to make decisions based on their
political or ideological beliefs. It is an important function of the judiciary
to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens from arbitrary laws that
impede them. But, the courts have allowed states to impede on the
fundamental right of a woman to procure abortion based on mere
speculation. This is especially troublesome when a state Senator openly
admits to passing a law restricting abortion because he believes that the
shift in the Court's dynamic would help the law pass the constitutional
test. 366 Hence, the Court, in order to protect the interest of the minority,
must adopt a more stringent standard.
The responsibility of narrowing a State's ability to impede on
abortions rights rests with Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy recently
joined the majority opinion written by Justice Breyer in Hellerstedt,3
where the majority made the undue burden standard stringent by adopting
the balancing test.36 8 When the Court decides to hear another abortion
related decision, Justice Kennedy should join his liberal colleagues in
further narrowing the undue burden standard. He must also realize, as
Justice Stevens did, that a State's interest in promoting fetal life, previability, is based on an antiquated notion that women are less capable of
deciding matters of gravity.3 69
Jane Roe's death 70 begs the question of whether Roe is on the path to
demise. As the Court stands today, this is unlikely based on the recent
Hellerstedt decision, but the age of two Justices who were part of the
majority in Hellerstedt, specifically Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg,
leaves the right to abortion in danger. If either of them retires, it is highly
likely that the right to abortion will no longer be fundamental, and States
will be able to impede on this right without any justification.

366. Max Blau et al., Ohio Passes 'Heartbeat'Abortion Bill; Leader Cites Trump's
Election, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/07/politics/ohio-abortion-bill/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2017).
367. See generally Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct 2292 (2016).
368. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text
369. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
370. Ellie Kaufman & Shawn Nottingham, Norma McCorvey, Plaintiffin Roe v. Wade
Abortion Cases, Dies, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/18/politics/norma-mccorvey-roe-vwade-figure-dies/index.htmI (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).

